NEWS

 

Criminal charges filed in Puppy Mill case

Half a dozen criminal charges of animal cruelty were filed this week against Jason and Serenna Larsen, a Gold-Barr (WA) area couple.  The Larsens are believed linked to a multi-million dollar puppy mill operation.

The charges are the result of a raid which took place on January 16th of this year in which 160 dogs were seized.  According to the authorities, most of the dogs were covered in urine and feces.  The authorities also found dead puppies in a freezer and a mummified dog in an outbuilding.  Veterinarians examining the dogs after the seizure, found a number of medical problems, including neurological problems.  The Larsens have denied ownership of the dogs which, they say, are owned by Renee Roske.  Ms. Roske is the owner of Wags ‘n Wiggles, a Snohomish kennel also under investigation by the Sheriff’s office.  Acting on a lead from this raid, the authorities also raided another kennel in Mt. Vernon and seized 450 dogs.

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Washington legislature enacts bill to allow court to grant custody of pet

Recognizing the link between animal abuse and child abuse and domestic violence, the Washington State Senate last week approved, by a vote of 35-9, a bill which defines companion animals as “personal property” in cases of domestic violence requiring protective orders. Representative Brendan Williams, (D., 22nd District – Olympia) had been the prime sponsor of the Bill, known as House Bill 1148, (HB1148) with Representatives Rodne, Simpson, Upthegrove, Haigh, Nelson, Rolfes, Sullivan, Hunt, Liias, Chase, Moeller, Goodman, Ormsby, Hursts, Kenney, Kirby, Eddy, Conway, Pedersen, Dunshee, Dickerson, Hasegawa, Sells, Appleton, Campbell and Herrera as sponsors. The Bill had previously passed the House on February 23rd.

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Latest legal developments and veterinary practice

Recently, the Washington Court of Appeals (Division I) decided two veterinary malpractice cases which significantly impacts both the practice of veterinary medicine and the recourse a pet owner may have in case of the death of a companion animal under a veterinarian’s care.

In the first case, Sherman v. Kissinger, the Court made clear that Washington’s Health Care Practioner statute1 that applies to suits brought against health care providers (e.g., hospitals, doctors, nurses, etc.), does not apply to veterinarians.  More importantly, the court rejected the veterinarian’s attempt to limit damages to the fair market value of the companion animal and ruled that the animal-human bond can be used to determine the intrinsic value of a companion animal.  Furthermore, the Court, in a footnote, noted that damages for emotional distress are recoverable with a willful conversion.

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Sherman v. Kissinger
2008 WL 4779071

The Plaintiff, Arlene Sherman, purchased Ruby, a 6-week old female toy poodle from a breeder for $550.  Subsequently, Ruby developed a urinary tract infection for which she was treated.  As a follow-up, Ms. Sherman brought Ruby to Broadway Veterinary Hospital (“BVH”) where Dr. Kissinger, Ruby’s vet, was to obtain a urine sample.  Ms. Sherman was allegedly told that the urine would be collected from a plastic bag placed under Ruby’s cage overnight.  Ms. Sherman then signed a blank “Financial Responsibility Agreement and Authorization for Professional Services” authorizing BVH to perform diagnostic procedures and agreeing to assume all financial responsibility.  Thereafter, Dr. Kissinger performed a cystocentesis, a procedure in which a needle is inserted in the animal’s bladder to collect the urine sample.  Upon inserting the needle, Dr. Kissinger drew blood instead of urine.  She withdrew the needle, applied pressure and placed the animal back in its cage where, a little over one (1) minute later, Ruby collapsed and died despite attempts at resuscitation.  Despite a number of tests, BVH the cause of death could not be determined.  Nevertheless, in a letter to Ms. Sherman, Dr. Kissinger implied that Ruby suffered from a rare clotting disorder. 

Ms. Sherman experienced distress and depression upon seeing Ruby’s body at the clinic less than 2 hours after dropping her off and sued for professional negligence, reckless breach of bailment, negligent hiring and supervision, negligent misrepresentation, conversion and trespass to chattels, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), and negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Ms. Sherman sought economic damages for the intrinsic value of her dog, as well as non-economic special and general damages for the loss of her dog.

Ruby’s breeder testified that the dog had no fair market value if it had a clotting disorder as the Defendants had implied.  Ms. Sherman testified that she would never have willingly sold Ruby.  Plaintiffs also retained two experts who, despite Defendants’ attempts to bar their testimony, testified that Ruby was “unique, not replaceable, and one-of-a-kind” whose “uniqueness was sharpened [by] the bond established between [Ruby] and Ms. Sherman during critical formative stages of development.”

Without scientific evidence, Defendants asserted that there was no generally accepted scientific theory or methodology to support the human-animal bond and the unique adaptation of Ruby under Ms. Sherman’s care.  Defendants also retained experts who, despite Plaintiffs’ attempts to bar the testimony, testified that Ruby had a fair market value of $100 to $200 when she died.  It is interesting to note that Defendant’s expert was allowed to testify despite the fact that she had failed to review any medical records, declarations or discovery before offering her opinion.

The Appellate Court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute relating to claims against health care providers. As such, all of Plaintiff’s actions were revived.  Moreover, the Appellate Court rejected Defendants’ attempt to obtain attorney’s fees by pleading damages less than $10,000 and then making an offer of settlement. 

The Court noted that, under Washington law, pets are categorized as personal property.  Of vital importance, the Court sided with the trial court and rejected the Defendants’ argument that damages were limited to the fair market value of Ruby, noting that: “The value of a pet animal is qualitatively different than non-animated property.”  However, the Court did not rule that Ms. Sherman was automatically entitled to Ruby’s intrinsic value, or that that is the only measure of damages a jury may consider.  The Court went on to quote from a previous case and reaffirm that, where the jury decides the proper measure of damages is the value to the owner, they cannot consider sentimental value (“[I]t is well established that a pet owner has no right to emotional distress damages or damages for loss of human-animal bond based on the negligent death or injury to a pet”).  In response to Plaintiff’s motion for clarification, the Court, in a footnote, further noted that damages for emotional distress are recoverable with willful conversion.

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What it means to veterinary practice and your rights as a pet owner

Beyond the fact that the statute relating to claims against health care providers does not apply to veterinarians, the case stands for the fact that the value of a companion animal is entirely up to the jury who will be instructed that:

  • Plaintiffs are entitled to the animal’s fair market value if the evidence supports the existence of such a value.
  • If the evidence does not support the existence the existence of a fair market value, then the Plaintiffs are entitled to the replacement value of the animal if such a value exists.
  • If the evidence does not support the existence of a replacement value, the Plaintiffs are entitled to the intrinsic value of the animal.

This also means that veterinarians should place due attention to obtaining the proper consent from a pet owner prior to any procedure, and duly explaining any and all potential harm which may result therefrom.

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Sexton v. Brown
2008 WL 4616705

On May 13, 2006, the Martins found a dog and brought it to Pet Emergency Center in Mount Vernon where they dog was first treated by Dr. Varney, who named the dog “Joe-e” and found him to be underweight but not ill.  Dr. Varney noted that Joe-e was “bright, alert, and responsive, not painful, and he jumped up friskily when you tried to play with him.”  After examining Joe-e’s blood under a microscope, Dr. Varney concluded that it “appeared normal []” and ”within normal limits.”  Dr. Varney’s assessment of Joe-e were echoed by the clinic’s veterinary technician and the veterinary assistant.

Dr. Varney’s recommendation was to “hospitalize [Joe-e] on fluids for the week-end and [] contact the humane society in the next morning.”  Dr. Varney then completed his shift and clinical responsibilities and duties fell upon Dr. Kenny Brown who was on duty that night.  Dr. Varney discussed his interactions with the Martins with Dr. Brown, noted that the Martins had found the dog; that the dog’s blood results were normal when examined under the microscope; that the dog was in no danger, and could stay the night with fluids and general observation. 

Dr. Brown proceeded to examine the blood slide and concluded that the dog had lymphosarcoma (or lymphoma)4.  Dr. Brown then contacted the Martins and told them that he suspected Joe-e suffered from lymphosarcoma.  The Martins then told Dr. Brown that they could not continue with further treatment and asked him what to do next.  According to the Martins, Dr. Brown “just sort of shrugged his shoulders” and nodded his head in agreement when the Martins asked if Joe-e need “to be put down.”  Dr. Brown suggested no other alternatives.   The Martins signed a euthanasia certificate in which did not indicate that the Martins were Joe-e’s owners, or authorized agents of the owners, or that Joe-e had not bitten any person or other animal in the previous 15 days5.  Dr. Brown then euthanized Joe-e and performed a necropsy which found no “gross evidence of cancer” but did reveal a scar on Joe-e’s abdomen.  Dr. Brown then disposed of Joe-e’s body through a communal cremation, and failed to preserve any tissue or organ which would have been appropriate to collect were he suspicious of a lymphosarcoma.

Months before he euthanized Joe-e, Dr. Brown had been advised that he was under a legal obligation to notify the local humane society when a stray animal was brought to the clinic, and further had to wait three (3) full working days prior to euthanasia.

While all of this was going on, Joe-e’s owners, Ms. Sexton and Mr. Recla, spent the next ten (10) days actively searching for him.  They hired search-and-rescue pet detectives, posted flyers, and contacted humane societies and veterinary hospitals in the area.  On May 23, they learned Joe-e had been killed on May 13 and that his body had been cremated.  Ms. Sexton and Mr. Recla considered Joe-e (real name Sparky) to be their ward and a sentient member of their family.  In fact, upon learning of Joe-e’s death, Ms. Sexton required medical care to treat symptoms of insomnia, irritability, hypersomulence, apathy, headaches, migraines, lethargy and muscle pain. Ms. Sexton was hospitalized on May 29th for a virulent migraine which required emergency room care and an injection of narcotic, a seldom administered treatment. Ms. Sexton also sought treatment from several health care providers who indicated a causal connection between the acts and omissions of Dr. Brown and Ms. Sexton apparent severe emotional distress.    

The Plaintiffs filed suit claiming sought damages for lost wages, medical bills, expenses incidental to the search and rescue effort, general damages including emotional distress and loss of enjoyment of life, pre-judgment interest, loss of use, and Joe-e’s intrinsic value, alive and deceased.

At trial, Plaintiffs testified that shortly after adopting Joe-e, he was diagnosed with a liver shunt6.  In an effort to save his life, Ms. Sexton authorized and paid for a surgery to correct Joe-e’s condition.  Ms. Sexton then resigned from her two volunteer positions with the Seattle Purebred Dog Rescue, choosing to devote her time to Joe-e.  Throughout their time together, Joe-e remained a special needs dog, remaining under medical supervision and being constantly treated by Ms. Sexton who dosed him three (3) times a day; monitored his input and output; hand-fed him; brushed his teeth; provided physical therapy; washed his faced at least twice a day; bathed and groomed him routinely; and weighed him daily to monitor his recovery from the shunt surgery.  Joe-e slept on a heated mat on the couple’s bed and was virtually always with them.  The couple even provided for Joe-e’s well-being in their wills.

Dr. Brown testified that Joe-e was suffering severely and needed to be euthanized, even though he estimated Joe-e’s pain level at 4-5 out of a possible 10.  However, he also noted that he had no reason to believe Joe-e would not have survived the night at the clinic, nor did he believe Joe-e’s death was imminent.  He also testified that Joe-e could have been put on IV fluids, placed on heating pad and monitored to stabilize his condition.  Dr. Brown admitted that he had treated an animal with lymphosarcoma who survived three (3) weeks, and further admitted that dogs with lymphosarcoma can live for months or years, and that lymphosarcoma was a treatable condition leading to remission about 10% of the time.  Dr. Brown also testified that, when running his own practice in Alaska, he would give stray animals food and water and report them to the local authorities.

Dr. Brown also admitted that had found Joe-e to be quiet and responsive with a coat of consistent length, without sparse, matts or patchy areas.  He had further found Joe-e’s temperature, pulse and gum color within normal range.

As in the Sherman v. Kissinger case, the Appellate Court agreed with the trial court that the health care provider statute did not apply to veterinarians.  The Appellate Court, however, reversed the trial court’s ruling to cap damages at fair or replacement value, noting that it was a factual question (i.e., up to the jury) whether Joe-e had an intrinsic value.  Lastly, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that preserved the claims of conversion and trespass to chattels, and further held that emotional distress was recoverable for those torts. 

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FOOTNOTE TO THE CASE

It is interesting to note that both the American Kennel Club (“AKC”) and the Pet Industry Joint Advisory Council (“PIJAC”) joined to file briefs advocating for the Defendants’ positions.  One must consider this an interesting position for organizations which are based on the human-dog bond.  In fact, in his report, AKC’s Chairman writes about how “canine health remains a top priority for AKC” and how the website includes a “Resource for dog lovers” and who’s core values include: (1) “cherish[ing] dogs as companions”, and (2) a “commit[ment] to the interests of dog owners.”  For its part, PIJAC’s webpage states that: “Many people in the US would not consider their family complete without a pet [].  Pets bring considerable joy into people’s lives and studies show that their companionship substantially benefits human health and well-being.”  One could call their stance in the Sexton case double-faced.

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Death of a Chihuahua worth $35,000

On June 21, 2007, Aliaksandr Rashchuk shot Tia, a Chihuahua, with a 9mm handgun.  At the time, Tia had been let out into her owner’s fenced backyard.  After the shooting, Tia’s owner, Sandra Giurbino, carried Tia to the emergency veterinary hospital which happened to be down the street from her house.  Given the severity of her injury, the prognosis was poor and would have required Ms. Giurbino to expand several thousands of dollars in fees, money she did not have and could not earn given her job as a housekeeper and elderly carekeeper.  Tia was therefore euthanized.

Rashchuk was subsequently apprehended by the authorities.  An investigation revealed that Mr. Rashchuk, who was 20 years old at the time of the shooting and Ms. Giurbino’s neighbor, had been drinking heavily with two friends, 21-year Vitaly Zubik Aleksey Buzunov,  in Rashchuk’s garage.  At some point, the group decided to go to purchase some beer.  Upon their return, they parked their car just behind the fence separating Mr. Rashchuk property from Ms. Giurbino’s, where Rashchuk passed out in the car from the alcohol.  Some time later, Rashchuk was startled awake either by Tia’s barking or his friend, Wubik, starting the car.  Rashchuk then took out a 9mm and shot Tia.  Zubik then drove away from the scene and the trio was apprehended some time later still drinking.

Rashchuk pled guilty to first degree animal cruelty, while Zubik pled guilty to attempted first degree animal cruelty.  Ms. Giurbino sued all three men for malicious injury to a pet, conversion, and concerted action, conspiracy and joint adventure.  Rashchuk was found in default.  Buzunov’s answer was struck by the court, effectively finding him in default, and sanctioned $500 for failing to respond to discovery.  The matter was referred to arbitration.

The arbitrator first found that a “strong, long-term and loving bond existed between  Ms. Giurbino and Tia.”  The arbitrator further found that “Tia’s death and the circumstances leading to it, caused Ms. Giurbino significant grief, emotional distress and disruption in her life.” 

The arbitrator went on to find in favor of Ms. Giurbino in the amount of $5,000 against Zubik finding that, though there was no evidence to indicate that he had participated in the plan to shoot Tia or could have foreseen it, the act of driving away after the shooting contributed to Ms. Giurbino’s distress.  The arbitrator then found against Rashchuk in the amount of $15,000 for the intrinsic value of Tia, another $15,000 in emotional distress, plus statutory costs and $150 in veterinary bills.

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The in's and out's of legal dog ownership

As government regulations mushroom, the ownership and care of a dog becomes more complicated.  Local governments are still, for the most part, in charge of basic regulations relative to animals.  This may include the requirement to properly vaccinate an animal; to purchase a license; limits on the number of pets per households; leash and scoop laws.  Although basically similar in every jurisdiction, the details of each regulation tends to be different from one place to another.  In the city of Seattle, regulations can be found in Chapter 9.25, Animal Control, of the Municipal Code.  Seattle, and surrounding municipalities, require not only that you buy a license for you dog, but that it be displayed on him at all times.  Of course, as a responsible owner you would want to keep the tag on your dog as, should your dog get lost, this will make it easy for animal control officers to identify him and properly notify you.

What happens if you don’t license your dog? Well, as long as your dog never bothers anyone , is never lost or stolen, never bites anyone, or isn’t nabbed by animal control, no one is likely to be the wiser.  However, if any of these unfortunate events happen, the price of not having a license will be significantly higher than the original price of the license.  Of course, you also run the risk of your animal companion not being returned to you if animal control can’t identify you as the owner.  In which case, it is highly likely that your companion animal may be euthanized.  If so, this is likely to occur in less time than it will for a licensed dog.

It is likely that, so long as your dog is not a nuisance, that you will be cited if your dog is off-leash.  However, technically “leash laws” require you to keep your dog on leash regardless of whether you have complete control or not of the animal.  For example, Chapter 9.25.100 of Seattle’s Municipal Code provides for fines of up to $500 for:

  • Allowing your dog to trespass on someone’s property;
  • Allowing your dog to enter a school area while school is in session or after-school activities are taking place;
  • Allowing your dog to bark, whine or howl;
  • Failing to confine your female dog while in estrus;
  • Allowing your dog to damage public or private property;
  • Allowing your dog to spill or spread garbage;
  • Allowing your animal to enter public or private property while tethered;
  • Allowing your dog to bite another animal or human; and,
  • Allowing your dog to chase or approach someone in a menacing way

Check with your local police department which may have adopted an informal policy to not issue citations at certain times of the day or night if the animal is under your control.

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Ode to a dog

George Vest, a 19th Century lawyer and Senator, reputedly represented a man whose dog had been shot at. 

As a closing argument, Mr. Vest reportedly said:

Gentlemen of the jury, the best friend a man has in this world may turn against him and become his enemy. His son and daughter that he has reared with loving care may become ungrateful. Those who are nearest and dearest to us, those whom we trust with our happiness and our good name, may become traitors to their faith. The money that a man has he may lose. It flies away from him when he may need it most. Man's reputation may be sacrificed in a moment of ill considered action. The people who are prone to fall on their knees and do us honor when success is with us may be the first to throw the stone of malice when failure settles its cloud upon our head.

The one absolutely unselfish friend that man can have in this selfish world, the one that never deserts him, the one that never proves ungrateful or treacherous, is his DOG. A man's dog stands by him in prosperity and in poverty, in health and in sickness. He will sleep on the cold ground, where the wintry winds blow and the snow drives fiercely, if only he may be near his master's side. He will kiss the hand that has no food to offer, he will lick the wounds and sores that come in encounter with the roughness of the world. He guards the sleep of his pauper master as if he were a prince. When all other friends desert, he remains. When riches take wing and reputation falls to pieces, he is as constant in his love as the sun in its journey through the heavens.

If fortune drives the master forth an outcast into the cold, friendless and homeless, the faithful dog asks no higher privilege than that of accompanying him to guard him against danger, and to fight against his enemies. When the last scene of all comes, and death takes his master in its embrace and his body is laid away in the cold ground, no matter if all other friends pursue their way, there by his graveside will the noble dog be found, his head between his paws and his eyes sad, but open in alert watchfulness, faithful and true even to death.

The first trial had resulted in an award of $25 to the dog’s owner (he had demanded $50).  Allegedly, in the retrial the jury awarded the plaintiff $500, even though the maximum award was $150.

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